2018 G7 statement on non-proliferation and disarmament
We are committed to working together and with our partners to promote international peace and security and to create the conditions for a more secure, stable and safer world. The international security environment continues to present significant challenges in areas of non-proliferation and disarmament, as illustrated by North Korea’s unlawful and threatening behaviour, ranging from nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches to the overt use of a chemical warfare agent; the continued use of chemical weapons and violations of international humanitarian norms in Syria; Iran’s ballistic missile launches and proliferation in the region; Russia’s acknowledged development of potentially destabilizing new types of nuclear weapons and missiles, its disregard for important arms control agreements, its unlawful annexation of Crimea and destabilizing aggression in eastern Ukraine, and its highly likely involvement in the use of a military-grade nerve agent, of a type developed by Russia, in an attack against civilians in Salisbury, United Kingdom, in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); the development of anti-satellite weapons; and the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons, particularly in North Africa and the Sahel.
We condemn in the strongest possible terms any attempt to challenge the rules-based international order in dangerous and destabilizing ways. It is essential that we, together with the broader international community, adopt coordinated approaches to prevent the use and spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, and reaffirm the importance of non-proliferation norms.
We underline the essential role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses, and we recall its undeniable success in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While recognizing the constraints of the current international security environment, we remain strongly committed to the goal of ultimately achieving a world without nuclear weapons, to be pursued using practical and concrete steps in accordance with the NPT’s emphasis on easing tension and strengthening trust among states. We advocate for the implementation of the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards in order to ensure the sustainability of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the NPT.
The G7 Non-Proliferation Directors’ Group is strengthening its efforts and better aligning programing and policy objectives. In particular, we are enhancing coordination and cooperation with the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) and the G7 Nuclear Safety and Security Group. Such coordination has
shown results in the case of providing assistance to Ukraine, and we are committed to achieving similar results elsewhere.
1. 2018 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting – We emphasize the common interest all States Parties have in maintaining and strengthening the NPT in all its aspects (non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy). We remain committed to strengthening and upholding the NPT, including by seeking its universalization. We call on all NPT States Parties to take concrete steps in the review cycle, including at each Preparatory Committee, to ensure a successful outcome at the 2020 Review Conference, which will mark the 50th anniversary of the NPT’s entry into force.
2. We reiterate the vital role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in supporting the implementation of nuclear safety and security worldwide—including through capacity building, human resources development and international cooperation—to facilitate the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear technology in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In addition, we support efforts to universalize IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol as the international verification standard and note the importance of their application to nuclear fuel cycle activities. Finally, we urge all states to ensure that the IAEA has the resources it needs to effectively carry out its monitoring and verification functions.
3. Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) Expert Preparatory Group – We welcome the work carried out to date in the high-level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group and at its Informal Consultative Meetings, which were open to all United Nations (UN) Member States. We also recognize the Group’s role in building trust and confidence among states—including between non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states—which is a necessary precursor to further progress on nuclear disarmament. The G7 remains strongly committed to working constructively in this process and looks forward to a positive outcome from the Group’s final meeting in May and June 2018. It is imperative that states engage in the necessary diplomacy to resolve the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament in order for long overdue FMCT negotiations to begin there. In the meantime, we continue to support a halt on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We call on China to join the rest of the P5 [permanent members of the UN Security Council] in implementing a moratorium on fissile material production for use in nuclear weapons, and call on all states that have not yet done so to declare and maintain moratoria on such production.
4. Nuclear disarmament verification initiatives – Nuclear disarmament verification is critical to the success of arms control and contributes to building trust and confidence among nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. We applaud the significant work undertaken to increase the global capacity in this area, which is currently lacking. We fully support the Norwegian-initiated Nuclear Disarmament Verification Group of Governmental Experts, which will convene in 2018 and 2019, as well as ongoing efforts in the quad initiative involving Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, and in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). We encourage participants in these efforts to further develop their cooperation and share experiences on verification in the context of the NPT. We regret recent decisions by China and Russia to withdraw from the IPNDV.
5. We recognize the 20th anniversary of the Ottawa Convention, which played a pivotal role in banning the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and addressing their crippling toll on human life. In the last two decades, 53 million mines have been destroyed and the number of new mine victims has also significantly decreased. However, we note with alarm the reversal of this trend in the last three years with year-over-year increases in casualties as a result of conflicts, including those involving non-state armed groups in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan and Ukraine. We also note with concern the continued use of anti-personnel mines in Syria and Myanmar, and the challenging situation Ukraine faces with the identification of newly mined areas under its jurisdiction but outside of its control, following entry into force of the Ottawa Convention. We remain committed to comprehensive mine action addressing mines, explosive remnants of war and unexploded ordnance. We recall that in many parts of the world, the remediation of post-conflict landscapes through mine action is a precondition for development and a prerequisite to meeting our commitments to the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. We commend the work being done under the Ottawa Convention to address the gendered impacts of anti-personnel mines and leverage opportunities to empower women and girls as agents of change in their communities.
6. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) High-Level Political Meeting – We reiterate our support for the PSI, now in its 15th anniversary year, which plays an important role in ensuring that states are prepared to and capable of interdicting shipments of WMD, their means of delivery and related material to and from state and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI represents a practical application of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, and participating states have played an important role in supporting the enforcement of UNSC sanctions against North Korea. We are committed to continuously improving implementation of the PSI interdiction principles, including by assisting with national capacity building, and urge the 105 PSI-endorsing states to regularly assess and adapt their national authorities. We hope that the May 2018 High-Level Political Meeting in Paris, France, will help the initiative to remain robust and relevant for tackling proliferators’ procurement strategies in the years ahead.
7. Third Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects – Illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs) cause more casualties than any other weapon, whether they are used in conflict settings, terrorist acts, organized crime or in street violence. Since 2001, the international community has effectively mobilized to fight this scourge through the UN Programme of Action (PoA), which covers issues such as stockpile management and security, exchange of information, marking and tracing, and the disposal of surplus stocks. We look forward to a productive PoA Review Conference in June 2018.
8. We strongly condemn North Korea’s unlawful and ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile programs and related activities, which threaten regional security and the international security architecture underpinned by the non-proliferation regime. In 2017, North Korea carried out a sixth nuclear explosive test and numerous ballistic missile tests, including missile tests at inter-continental range, some of which flew over Japan. We reiterate that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will never be accepted as a nuclear power, and urge it to fully implement all relevant UNSCRs, to dismantle WMDs, including biological and chemical weapons, and missiles as well as related facilities in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and to return at an early date to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards. We call on North Korea to halt all WMD programs, to accede to the CWC and comply with its obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
9. In our pursuit of a diplomatic resolution to North Korea’s continued WMD and ballistic missile development activities, we reaffirm our commitment to a strong and unified response, particularly with regard to sanctions. North Korea’s offer to meet with the United States and discuss denuclearization suggests the global pressure campaign is working. As we engage with North Korea, it is imperative that all UN Member States ensure the full and robust implementation of all relevant UNSCRs until the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea is achieved. It is more important than ever to close gaps in the global sanctions regime, disrupt North Korea’s overseas arms sales and sever underlying relationships that perpetuate these exports, counter its illicit networks and prevent Pyongyang from securing the key revenue, resources and prohibited items it needs to support its destabilizing WMD programs. We therefore commit to using the tools at our disposal to help build the capacity of partner countries to comply with and enforce these sanctions. We fully support the work of the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea, which remains a critical body for monitoring North Korea’s sanctions evasion and identifying areas where greater international efforts are needed. We underline that measures imposed against North Korea are intended to create conditions conducive to diplomacy, and to compel North Korea to realign its strategic outlook and abandon its WMD and ballistic missile programs.
10. We call for the full implementation of UNSCR 2231. We are committed to permanently ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful, in line with its NPT obligations and its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) never to seek, develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. We strongly support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its crucial monitoring and verification work to help ensure Iran’s compliance with its JCPOA and other commitments, including safeguard obligations. We call on UN member states to make voluntary contributions to the IAEA to ensure it has the resources necessary to fulfill this vital role.
11. We deeply regret Iran’s ballistic missile tests, which are inconsistent with UNSCR 2231 and which contribute to increased tensions and instability in the region. We call upon Iran to play a constructive regional role and urge it to cease its unlawful transfers of ballistic missile technology to states and non-state actors. We intend to continue to our work to counter Iran’s regional proliferation of ballistic missiles and its unlawful arms transfers.
12. Recalling that evidence of Syria’s construction of an undeclared nuclear reactor, subsequently destroyed in 2007, was first reported by the IAEA Director General to the Board of Governors 10 years ago, we call upon Syria to urgently cooperate with the IAEA to remedy its longstanding safeguards noncompliance and to provide the IAEA with access to all information, sites, material and persons necessary to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. We also call upon all states to avoid engagement with Syria on proliferation-sensitive nuclear cooperation.
13. We are appalled by the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria by the Assad regime and by Daesh, as documented by successive reports of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). We are united in condemning, in the strongest possible terms, the use of chemical weapons in the April 7, 2018, attack in Eastern Ghouta, Syria. The use of chemical weapons by a state party is a breach of the CWC and constitutes a threat to international peace and security; it directly undermines the international norms and standards against such use. Such egregious acts demand a concerted response from the international community to hold those responsible to account. To that end, we are deeply disappointed that Russia continues to shield the Assad regime from accountability, including by repeatedly voting against renewing the mandate of the JIM or another impartial and independent mechanism to determine responsibility for chemical weapons attacks in Syria. We fully support all efforts made by the United States, the United Kingdom and France to degrade the Assad regime’s ability to use chemical weapons and to deter any future use, demonstrated by their action taken on April 13, 2018. This response was limited, proportionate and necessary, and taken only after exhausting every possible diplomatic option to uphold the international norm against the use of chemical weapons. We encourage the UNSC and the OPCW to recognize the findings of the 7th JIM report of October 26, 2017, and take steps to ensure that the perpetrators of chemical weapons attack are held accountable. We urge Syria to adhere to its obligations under the CWC, to finally provide a complete declaration to the OPCW, to desist from further use of chemical weapons, to hand over for destruction all such weapons and their precursors, and to cooperate fully with OPCW and UN investigation mechanisms. We call on all States Parties to the CWC to ensure that they do not contribute to the proliferation of chemical weapons in Syria or elsewhere, and to stand together against impunity for those who develop or use these weapons anywhere, at any time and under any circumstance.
14. We are united in condemning, in the strongest possible terms, the attack which took place in Salisbury, United Kingdom, on March 4, 2018. This use of a military grade nerve agent, of a type developed by Russia, constitutes the first offensive use of a nerve agent in Europe since the Second World War and is a grave challenge not only to the security of the U.K. but to our shared security. It is an assault on U.K. sovereignty. Any use of chemical weapons by a state party under any circumstance is a clear breach of international law and a violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW has now independently confirmed the findings of the United Kingdom relating to the identity of the toxic chemical that was used in Salisbury. We share, and agree with, the U.K.’s assessment that it is highly likely that the Russian Federation was responsible for the attack and that there is no plausible alternative explanation. We call on Russia to urgently address all questions related to the incident in Salisbury. Russia should provide full and complete disclosure of its previously undeclared Novichok program to the OPCW in line with its international obligations. We call on Russia to live up to its CWC obligations as well as its responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to uphold international peace and security.
15. In light of the atrocities committed in Syria, and the alleged use of nerve agents as a tool of assassination by North Korea and elsewhere, we strongly condemn the maintenance of any clandestine chemical or biological weapons program by any state, and demand that all possessors of such programs terminate them immediately and provide credible assurances to the international community that such programs have ended and will not be reconstituted. We will spare no effort to ensure that all persons involved in such abuses are held strictly to account.
16. The Sahel and North Africa remain a priority for the G7. In particular, we are committed to combatting the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, which present a significant threat to regional peace and security. We will continue working closely with the African Union (AU) through the open G7-AU Donor Coordination Platform to significantly enhance the control of SALW in the Greater Sahel and the whole of Africa.
17. We reaffirm our support for effective measures to promote further verifiable nuclear arms control and disarmament, thereby reducing the risk of conflict, forestalling destructive arms races and promoting international peace and security. In particular, we advocate measures to build trust and confidence, to promote dialogue and cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states and to enhance transparency and verification. We are committed to a progressive and incremental approach, which takes into account and seeks to ameliorate the international security environment, with the ultimate goal shared by all States Parties to the NPT of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. We call on all states supporting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to reflect on its potential implications for the NPT and its review process, and to ensure that it does not undermine existing global nuclear safeguards or other efforts to preserve international security.
18. We acknowledge the United States’ and Russia’s reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and applaud their meeting the central limits of the New Strategic Arms Reduction (New START) Treaty as of February 5, 2018. The preservation of the New START Treaty contributes to international stability, and we express our strong support for early and active dialogue on a successor to the New START Treaty. Continued adherence to and implementation of relevant existing non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control treaties is essential for strengthening mutual trust and improving international stability and security. This includes compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which is key to preserving Euro-Atlantic and international security. In this regard, we are worried by a Russian missile system that raises serious concerns regarding its compliance with the INF Treaty, and we urge Russia to address these concerns in a substantial and transparent way. We are similarly dismayed by Russia’s acknowledged development of potentially destabilizing new nuclear weapons systems.
19. We note the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’s potential contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We encourage all states to maintain existing voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and urge those states that have not instituted such moratoriums to do so. We also fully support the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, in particular the establishment of the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre. The organization has demonstrated its value by providing reliable data on North Korea’s illicit nuclear tests, and we strongly encourage all states to complete the International Monitoring System and to ensure data availability as a matter of priority. To that end, we also encourage all states signatories to express their commitment to the Treaty by fully settling their assessed contributions.
20. We believe existing Nuclear Weapons Free Zones are a tool to help promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as regional security. We remain committed to the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD and their means of delivery in the Middle East on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by all states in the region, and call for renewed inclusive regional dialogue to achieve this goal.
21. We reiterate our support for the Missile Technology Control Regime and urge all states to act in accordance with its guidelines, which are aimed at limiting the risk of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and related technologies, including unmanned aerial vehicles, capable of the delivery of WMD. We ask participating states of all export control regimes to reinforce efforts to stay ahead of potential proliferators by increasing awareness of emerging technologies and scientific developments that could be used for WMD production and delivery. We welcome sharing approaches to challenges posed by intangible technology transfers, proliferation financing and broader proliferation networks, including through enhanced engagement with industry and academia. We continue to encourage universalization of the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), already subscribed to by 139 states, which remains to date the only multilateral instrument encompassing transparency and confidence-building measures aimed at building an international predisposition against ballistic missile proliferation. We call on all states that have subscribed to the HCOC to increase their participation in the HCOC and to further improve its implementation. The effective implementation of international export controls is also crucial to combatting the proliferation of ballistic missile technology.
22. We reaffirm our commitment to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) as a proven and effective mechanism for addressing WMD proliferation threats worldwide. We recognize the ongoing need for the GPP and underscore the importance for the 31 current active members to continue to deliver coordinated activities and programming to combat chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The GP is helping to build counter-proliferation capabilities globally to address illicit proliferation activities, including by North Korea, and has provided crucial support to the IAEA’s verification of Iran’s implementation of its JCPOA commitments. In cooperation with Ukraine, the GP has contributed significantly to preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological materials. The GP has also contributed significantly to the destruction of declared stockpiles of chemical weapons in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Russia. We call upon Syria and Russia to declare and eliminate the remainder of their chemical weapon capabilities.
23. We reiterate our strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone under any circumstance, emphasizing that such use is unacceptable and contravenes international norms and standards against such use. Any government, individual or entity responsible for using chemical weapons must be held accountable, since accountability for perpetrators is a crucial tool to prevent further use of chemical weapons. We strongly support the International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons and call on others to join this partnership. We reiterate our commitment to addressing the confirmed use of chemical weapons by ISIL/Daesh, and the serious threat of biological weapons use by non-state actors.
24. We strongly support the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the work of OPCW. We call on all States Parties to meet their obligations under the Convention. Universalization of the CWC remains a priority, and we call on those states not yet party to ratify or accede to the Convention without condition or delay. In addition, we encourage all States Parties to engage constructively in the Fourth CWC Review Conference in November.
25. We reaffirm the importance of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). We welcome the consensus reached in December 2017 on a new program of expert meetings leading up to 2021 Review Conference and urge all States Parties to take full advantage of this opportunity to work together to address the threat of biological weapons. We strongly support ongoing universalization of the BTWC and underscore that the effective enforcement of the international ban on biological weapons remains a key priority. In this context, we encourage all State Parties to work toward the full and effective implementation of the BTWC. We also demand the prompt declaration and elimination of all clandestine biological weapons programs worldwide. In addition, with a view to strengthening implementation and enhancing confidence, we call upon states to submit the agreed-upon annual confidence-building measures reports and encourage them to participate in voluntary transparency and confidence-building initiatives, such as peer reviews. Further, we emphasize that any use of biological weapons must be met with a swift and effective response. We therefore encourage all States Parties to cooperate to reinforce the operational capability of the UN Secretary General’s Mechanism for investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, and highlight the importance of preparedness coordination in response to the use of biological weapons, including the need to ensure that preparations for international outbreak response take into account the particular challenges that may accompany deliberate use.
26. UNSCR 1540 and its successor resolutions enjoy the unconditional support of the G7 as critical components of the global non-proliferation architecture and are essential to combatting the acquisition of WMD and their means of delivery by non-state actors. We continue to encourage full and universal implementation and reporting to the 1540 Committee, and recognize the importance of assistance and coordination mechanisms—including through the GP and with the private sector, civil society and academia—to ensure full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We applaud the Wiesbaden Process as an example of how dialogue and cooperation between states and private-sector actors can advance the objectives of UNSCR 1540 and UNSCR 2325.
27. We are committed to facilitating efforts by states to use nuclear materials or embark on nuclear power programs for civilian purposes in accordance with the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation, and we encourage these states to develop a nuclear governance culture that takes into account interfaces between nuclear safety, security and safeguards, as well as cyber threats.
28. We remain vigilant in ensuring that terrorists and other malicious actors do not obtain materials for committing acts of nuclear or radiological terrorism. In that context, we support the efforts of the Nuclear Security Contact Group to help ensure that we continue to implement our shared commitments to enhancing nuclear security worldwide. We also commend the work of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). By convening a broad array of technical experts and policy makers from its 88 partner states and five official observer organizations, GICNT continues to provide a critical forum to address the shared global threat of nuclear terrorism.
29. We encourage universalization and implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as amended in 2005, and call on states that have not yet done so to become parties to these key nuclear security instruments. We encourage the states that have not done so to become contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and work toward their effective and sustainable implementation. Iran is the only state with an operational nuclear power plant that is not party to any of these conventions, and we call on it to adhere to them.
30. We recognize that most conflicts are fought with conventional weapons, including with small arms and light weapons (SALW). The illicit proliferation and unlawful use of SALW can fuel and prolong conflict, lead to regional instability, contribute to violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, impede development and exacerbate the threats posed by terrorist groups and organized crime. The challenge of SALW proliferation is particularly acute in Africa, the Middle East, the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Latin America and the Caribbean. We remain committed to providing assistance in combatting the illegal trafficking in arms as a priority. We call upon all states to report their international transfers of SALW to the UN Register of Conventional Arms to assist in identifying excessive and destabilizing accumulations of SALW. We note the important role that the Arms Trade Treaty can play in assisting efforts to address the challenges posed by irresponsible international transfer of conventional arms. We acknowledge the importance of the Fourth Conference of State Parties of the Arms Trade Treaty. We recognize the International Tracing Instrument and the UN Register of Conventional Weapons, and we urge all states to implement their commitments under the relevant instruments. We also encourage all states to consider ratification of the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
31. We note the importance of mainstreaming gender in all non-proliferation and disarmament work. It is important to recognize that women play a variety of roles in conflicts, including as victims, community protectors, combatants, arms dealers, smugglers and providers of support to armed actors. To capture all these varied experiences and perspectives, women need to be fully included in preventing, managing and resolving violent conflict, and post-conflict peace processes, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Women must be afforded the opportunity to be full partners in security, disarmament and arms control discussions and organizations; relevant international security organizations; the tracking and analysis of illicit trafficking networks and trends; all aspects of the destruction of illicit small arms and light weapons; and receiving capacity building and assistance.
32. We continue to promote effective systems of national controls for exports and imports of conventional arms, such as those called for in the Arms Trade Treaty, to contribute to international and regional peace, security and stability. The effective enforcement of the international non-proliferation regime demands that all states strengthen national export controls on sensitive goods and technologies. We urge all states to act in accordance with the guidelines of the international export control regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement, and we support efforts through the GP to provide support to countries requiring export control capacity building assistance. We welcome in particular India’s participation in the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group, and look forward to its constructive engagement with the Nuclear Suppliers Group to strengthen global non-proliferation efforts.
33. Outer space activities play an indispensable role in the social, economic, scientific and technological development of states, as well as in maintaining international peace and security. We reiterate the need to advance and develop norms of responsible behavior in outer space, in order to strengthen safety, stability and sustainability of outer space and help all countries benefit from the peaceful use and exploration of space. We call on all states to advance cooperative frameworks that promote responsible uses and exploration of outer space, including through the implementation of the measures contained in the recommendations of the 2013 UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures [TCBMs] in Outer Space Activities report. We are committed to preventing conflicts from extending into outer space through voluntary, pragmatic TCBMs and guidelines, and we regret the undue focus on flawed treaty proposals in the recently established UN GGE on this topic. We support efforts to finalize and implement a compendium of clear, practicable and proven Guidelines for Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities by the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, building on agreed-upon technical guidelines recently achieved at the 55th session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee.